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Have concepts such as political legitimacy as well as democracy been further undermined by the recent financial crisis of 
2008? This is what many social scientists have asked among many other questions which have addressed the effects of the 
crisis on political institutions and political processes. The change of government in Italy in 2011 and the Italian election of 2013 
reflect these assumptions and they reflect the crisis of European politics. In fact, EU countries, notably Southern European 
countries have had their political and economic agenda dictated by EU bureaucrats and influenced by the Big Three credit 
rating agencies. There are different indicators which show that the political and democratic institutions of a country are 
challenged. For instance, the public opinion mistrust about political elites or the effects that globalisation and deregulation have 
had on societies, in turns, reflect the problem of corruption and illegality, and the erosion of national sovereignty. Within this 
context, this paper will investigate the crisis of legitimacy and the democratic deficit by analysing the recent events which 
characterised Italian politics following the economic crisis. Firstly, it will be discussed the relation between the concepts of 
legitimacy ‘n the context of democratic institutions.  Secondly, it will be discussed the political situation of Italy since 2011 and 
the way a technocratic government replaced a democratically elected government as well as a political agenda explicitly 
dictated by the EU bureaucrats. Moreover, it will be taken into consideration the different factors which led to such a dramatic 






The economic crisis of 2008 was set off primarily by the Anglo American finance sector and by central banks, which 
tolerated aggressive financial practices (Helleiner 2010). Nevertheless, the crisis also exposed negligent banking 
practices and long-term government overspending which aggravated the economic performance of countries, particularly 
in Europe where extraordinary measures have been taken to contain increasing public deficit. Although it seems evident 
that since at least the 1970s the condition of crisis has characterised the economy of capitalism, it is within these events 
that the political system of many countries have been put under particular stress. The crisis, in fact, hit particularly 
European countries, which had an already weak economy, and it caused a crisis of the entire Eurozone.  
There are many analyses discussing the impact of the economic crisis on the political structures of modern 
democracies (Van Rijckeghem and Weder 2008; Gallie (ed.) 2013; Morlino and Piana 2014). Such analyses mainly 
consider the effect of the crisis in terms of the erosion of sovereignty and democracy, since some states had their 
economic agenda dictated by the EU commission and by the pressure of economic international institutions. In fact, EU 
countries, notably Southern European countries have had their political and economic agenda imposed by the EU 
Commission and influenced by the Big Three credit rating agencies1. The change of government in Italy in 2011 and the 
Italian election of 2013 reflect this outcome and they reflect the crisis of European politics. 
Within this context, this paper will investigate the democratic deficit and the crisis of legitimacy in Italy, bearing in 
mind, however, that the crisis of democracy and legitimacy is a constant of advanced capitalist democracies. Firstly, it will 
be considered the theories, which analyses the crisis of political legitimacy, of Jürgen Habermas ‘Legitimation Crisis’ and 
the ‘post-democracy’ approach elaborated by Colin Crouch (2004). Moreover, Lauk’s argument that in the political 
structure of the EU there are not the principles, which originated in the European Enlightenment. Secondly, it will be 
analysed the political situation of Italy since 2011 and the way a technocratic government replaced a democratically 
elected government as well as a political agenda explicitly dictated by the EU bureaucrats. 
These events point out at least two dimensions of the issue of democratic deficit and the crisis of legitimation. One 
                                                            
1  Standard & Poor's, Moody's, and Fitch Group.  
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is about public opinion mistrust of political elites and the second is about the effects that globalisation and deregulation 
have on societies. It is in times of economic crises that governments have to take drastic measures to tackle and prevent 
economic recessions and such events expose their efficiency in resolving, within short time, such problems. In the case 
of Italy, the economic crisis of 2008 uncovered the inefficiency of the state institutions related to both bad administration 
and corruption within Italy’s political elite. Moreover, EU measures, under the SGP (Stability and Growth Pact) 2 thought 
to contribute to face the crisis were in fact measures to limit state expenditure, which also prevented investment in 
innovation. The growing budget deficit put pressure on the government to ensure financial stability through the approval 
of several cost-cutting policies and since 2011 this model of austerity and fiscal constraint suffocated the fragile Italian 
economy bringing it in line with negative performances of other countries such as Greece, Portugal, Spain and Ireland 
(Passarelli and Tuorto 2014:153). The effect of the recession together with the external pressure of the EU institutions 
forced an unconventional change of governments. In fact, Berlusconi resigned in November 2011 and was replaced by a 
technocratic government and since 2011 Italy has witnessed three different governments from which at least the first two, 
influenced by the austerity policies imposed by the EU.  
    
2. The Crisis of Democracy and Legitimacy in Western Democracies 
 
In analysing the crisis of legitimacy in advanced democracies, different aspects can be defined. For instance, the 
negative effects of economic related issues and the effects of globalisation as reflected in the role of supranational 
institutions and related to this, the inability of democratic institutions to represent the interest of societal groups. In this 
section, three main approaches, which have characterised the debate about the crisis of legitimacy in Western 
democracies, will be analysed. The first is that articulated by Jürgen Habermas, “Legitimation Crisis” which points out the 
government’s inability to solve economic crises and the second is that of Colin Crouch (2004), the post-democracy 
debate, where globalisation, deregulation, loss of collective organisational capacity in society have eroded democracy 
Merkel (2013).  A third understanding of the crisis of democracy and legitimacy can also be seen in the position of Lauk 
(2014). He maintains that the institution of the European Union and thus EU legislations, were not conceived and 
established within the principles of the Enlightenment and therefore they lack the kind of consent characteristic of 
representative democracy and that developed from the Enlightenment movement. 
Habermas points out four different types of crisis which are chronologically inter-connected: ‘Economic Crisis’ 
related to the economy, ‘Rationality Crisis’, related to the administrative structure of the state, ‘Legitimation Crisis’ related 
to the institutions of democracy and ‘Motivational Crisis’, related to individuals and their work ethics (Habermas 1975). 
For Habermas these for dimensions of crisis are identified with the contradictions in capitalist economies in the West. In 
terms of legitimation crisis, Habermas argues that lack of mass support for democratic institutions occurs because 
governments are not able to solve economic downfalls, unemployment and social security issues which lead to the 
legitimation crisis of the state. This may also lead to a crisis of social integration and ultimately to an erosion of work ethic 
and a ‘rejection of capitalist principles of the whole capitalist and democratic order’ (Merkel 2013).  
The second analysis about the crisis of legitimacy in Western democracies is addressed by the post-democracy 
debate elaborated by Colin Crouch (2004). The latter argues that the ‘democratic moment’ has passed for the Western 
world. Globalisation, deregulation, ‘loss of collective organisational capacity’ in society have eroded democracy. Although 
formal democratic institutions continue to exist, they have lost their essence (Crounch 2004:22). Crouch focusses on the 
new ‘imbalance collective organisations of capital and labour’. The less advantaged groups in society do not have a 
collective identity and the ability to organise collective action. For this reason, private funds for political campaigns, the 
powerful position of multinational companies, influential lobbies together with the inability of concerted action of the lower 
classes have created a post-democratic situation. Privatisation and neo-liberalization are in contrast with the principle of 
democracy in the post democratic age and traditional mass democracy based on party discipline is slowing getting 
weaker and eventually will dissolve. 
A third analysis that highlights the erosion of democracy by supranational institutions is that of Lauk who analyses 
                                                            
2 The Maastricht Treaty of 1992 set the rules for all member states to achieve the Economic Monetary Union (EMU), targeting low 
inflation, low interest rates and contained public debt and spending. The intention was to keep state expenditure under control in order to 
create a stable condition for the new currency to come. The SGP was than agreed in 1997 and these rules were set to keep the annual 
budget deficit below 3% of the GDP and the total public debt 60% of the GDP. Failing to respect these parameters resulted in the 
country to take measures to reduce its deficit. If it broke these rules for three consecutive times, the Commission could impose a fine of 
up to 0.5 of the GDP (CIVITAS). 
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the political institutions of the EU and maintains that in the political structure of the EU there are not the principles which 
originated in the European Enlightenment. Which means that the law making process is without legitimation. This is 
because there is not a European parliament that has the right to initiate and create any law. Moreover, the EU parliament 
is denied from the function of a democratic parliament where the ‘will of the people’ has the characteristic of self-
determination. In the European settings, the right of the legislative branch to initiate is conferred to the executive branch, 
the EU Commission which is not democratically elected3. In these settings, there is not just a ‘democratic deficit’ but also 
a totalitarian feature since the Commission is composed of unelected bureaucrats. If the European parliament does not 
have the right to instruct the EU Commission it follows that in the EU an unelected executive determines how the EU 
should be governed (Lauk 2014:5-6). 
Lauk identifies two factors which are responsible for the question of illegitimacy of EU legislation. The first is that 
there is a high number of lobbyists (17.000) which have more political weight than the EU voters who are also mostly 
unware of the decisions taken in Brussels. The second factor is that when an unelected official of the Commission 
appoint the members of the unelected so-called expert groups to draw a law, those experts are drawn from lobbyist or 
industry insiders. Moreover, former EU officials hold positions in those industries that they have asked to regulate4. 
According to Lauk, the financial industry was regulated in this way and paradoxically, the same groups of experts 
appointed with the task of finding solutions to the crisis were the same insiders implicated in the crisis.  
These three theories about the crisis of democracy point out three different dimensions of the crisis which are 
interconnected. In the case of Habermas’‘legitimation crisis’, the economic factor is important since it triggers a series of 
events which eventually results in the lack of public support  for the administrative system and the legitimation crisis of the 
state. In the case of the post democratic theory, the cause of democratic and legitimacy deficit is the effect of 
globalisation on national governments and the way administrative systems are delegitimised because they do not  
represent the interest of social groups but are influenced by powerful multination companies. In this respect, the EU 
institutions, with its democratic deficit ,due to the way they are functioning, have the effect of circumventing the 
governments of national states where democratic representation takes place. This was particularly true when actions 
under the name of austerity measures were taken in order to deal with the effects of the 2008 economic crisis. 
 
3. The Economic Crisis and Democratic Deficit in Italy 
 
The 2008 economic crisis had an effect on the political structure of Italy. In 2011, a technocratic government replaced a 
democratically elected government and particularly measures were taken, by the EU commission, for countries which had 
a high public debt in order to save the Eurozone. Since 2011 Italy had also fallen into recession and severe economic 
contraction, which only recently (end of 2015) has started to give timid and positive responses. The economic crisis also 
has had an effect on Italy’s economic performance. In 2013, the GDP fell causing the longest recession in 20 years. 
Individual and household consumption expenditure decreased from 2012 until early 2015, also with critical labour 
difficulties to the point that unemployment reached a peak of more than 3 million (13%) with 40% amongst the youth 
(Passarelli ve Tuorto, 2014:153).  Italy also faces some challenges also in the sphere of research and innovation. Firstly, 
there are insufficient reforms and low performance of the higher education system and there is low share of skilled human 
capital. The higher education system lacks financial and human resources and the effects of the crisis and corruption on 
the finances of the government are impeding future development.    
The technocratic executive led by former EU commissioner Mario Monti took office in November 2011 replacing 
the Berlusconi government after he had resigned. This change was described as an emergency measure to deal with 
financial and economic difficulties. The crisis deposed the leader who dominated Italian politics for two decades, Silvio 
Berlusconi and its Pdl (People of Freedom party). The reason for this downfall was Italy's soaring bond yields which 
                                                            
3 (Art. 17. No. Lisbon Treaty) 
4The In 1999 the EU established the Financial Service Action Plan (FSAP) with the purpose to create a single market and financial 
corporations had a great influence on the FSAP. An important player was the Commission High Level Review Group with its members 
coming from the financial sector.  Other expert groups were industry bias. The Report Alliance for Lobbying Transparency and Ethics 
Regulation denounced concern about the democratic decision making within the Commission for not taking into account all concerned 
views. According to its own rules the Commission, when drafting new legislation, is supposed to consult as widely as possible to 
minimise the risks of vested interest affecting the advice. In fact from 167 expert of the Exper Groups, 160 were from the financial 
industry. The De Larosiere group appointed with the task of proposing a reaction to the crisis was dominated by the financial sector 
insider implicated in the crisis (Lakus 2014:7). 
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entered the 7% danger zone, generally regarded as unsustainable (EU Austerity Drive - BBC 2012). The markets were 
very uncertain about Italy's public debt, which rose to 1.9 trillion euros (approximately 120% of GDP) at the end of 2011. 
It was in fact a technocratic government with people outside the world of politics with the support of the centre-right and 
centre-left parties PdL and PD (Democratic Party) (Marangoni 2012:140-43). The government in fact took office with the 
task of managing and seeking to withstand the period of economic and financial crisis and reducing the huge size of 
public debt. In addition, this was a move to show the Eurozone leaders credible leadership in the country. The first 
stability budget law included pension reform and a property tax in order to reassure the markets. Nevertheless, the 
government greatest achievement was that of restoring credibility for the Italian political system. The Monti government 
also held a spending review that brought a €3 billion cut in spending out of a €300 billion budget. 
Although Monti enjoyed high levels of personal credibility during his short period as prime minister, his anti-crisis 
measures disappointed many Italians due to their reform and cuts on pensions and increase of property taxes. On 21 
December 2012 Mario Monti, after a year as a prime minister, resigned. The resignation of Monti, however, coincided 
with the end of the electoral mandate and the 2013 general elections produced an extremely complicated puzzle and 
turnout dropped to an oddly low level for a parliamentary election in Italy (75%) (Diamanti 2013). 
The Democratic Party (PD) and the PdL, the two main parties, lost millions of votes in comparison with their 
performance at the 2008 elections (Passarelli and Tuorto, 2013). The real winner of the election was the M5S (Five Star 
Movement), which obtained 25% of the vote. This new party, formed and led by the comedian and popular blogger Beppe 
Grillo, also prevented the formation of a centre-left government. Following the consequences of the economic crisis, 
Italian voters punished the political parties and prevented the opposition to acquire a substantial majority. In fact, almost 
half of the voters chose to give their votes to an anti-party movement or preferred abstention (D’Alimonte 2013). 
In this situation, and with the inability to form a government, the Italian president Giorgio Napolitano5, in order to 
avoid another election appointed a government of national unity that could continue with the reforms requested by the 
EU. The Letta government took sit on the 18th of April 2013 and sought to take advantage of the degree of autonomy 
guaranteed to it by the situation of emergency generated by the economic crisis. The new government also had to 
manage a majority sustaining a grand coalition which was very diverse and fragmented (Newell and Carbone 2013). 
However, the Letta government was replaced in February 2014, by a new government. This change was explained by the 
failure of Letta’s attempt or to the lack of effectiveness of the executive he led. This was the political line of the newly 
elected general secretary of the PD, Matteo Renzi, who demanded and obtained a government change, with the purpose 
of changing the strategy of the government. 
The Renzi government, thus, entered office without being elected. Nevertheless, Renzi obtained a certain degree 
of democratic legitimacy by wining 40% of the vote in the European elections. Several elements explain this success. 
Firstly, as soon as he entered office he spoke out against European austerity and German domination. He called for the 
revision of the EU treaties and he disputed the idea that there had been an economic recovery.  In such circumstances, 
he was able to propose himself as the man who wanted change immediately, which would improve the living conditions of 
all Italians. With this approach Renzi also managed to get substantial support from the public opinion and main stream 
media, who saw in him an element of change and did not seem to be too much concern about the unorthodox way he 
came to be Prime Minister.   
 
4. Conclusion  
 
The effects of the crisis on Italy’s economic and political sphere can then be seen in the drastic economic measures 
imposed by the EU commission under the parameters set by the SGP. All the governments that followed, after the 
resignation of Silvio Berlusconi, were not formed with the consent of the people given that the coalitions that made 
possible these governments were made of parties with radical differences. The various changes of government and 
economic policies which aimed at cutting public expenditure and at radical pension and labour reform, even though 
necessary, were not the result of internal political discussions within parties but the directives from a supranational level, 
the EU. Moreover, the results of the general elections in 2013, which did not produce a clear majority, showed the 
dissatisfaction of the electorate which preferred to give their votes to the M5S as an act of protesting. This act of protest 
                                                            
5 Giorgio Napolitano interventions have changed the political process or the parties. Napolitano’s decision to choose Monti as prime 
minister also introduced new rules of the game to the practice of government in Italy. This can also be said for the appointment of the 
Letta government in a situation of political stagnation after the 2013 general elections, and thereafter for the appointment of Renzi.  
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aimed at the main parties of the centre left and the centre right accused by the majority of the public opinion of corruption 
and inability to solve the problems of the country. Indeed, the economic crisis of 2008 exposed the long-term problems of 
Italy, which would prevents its development in economic terms but also in terms of public administration, in line with the 
others EU countries. Starting with the problem of corruption which affects the Italian public administration at local and 
central level and the issue of tax evasion which just in 2014 costed the state 4,1 billion euro.  
Within this context, it is possible to see three aspects of the crisis of democratic and political legitimation in Italy. 
The first one is that proposed by Habermas and it is concerned with the inability of Italian political parties to solve political 
and economic problems, together with the dissatisfaction of public opinion and lack of trusts in political elites. Much of this 
discontent is related to the corruption of the political class, mentioned before, and the lack of engagement with the 
problems of the country. The advent of the crisis, not only weaken the Italian economy but also exposed inefficiency of 
the Italian political class. If we look at the reforms implemented by the various Italian governments, beginning with the 
Berlusconi government, which was in power at that moment the crisis began, no particular efforts were made to respond 
appropriately and contain the economic downfall. The second aspect is related to the effect of supranational institutions 
and agencies such as the EU, the IMF and the Big Threes. Such institutions can affect the economic policies of a country. 
Moreover, in the case of the EU, an unelected body of bureaucrats imposed an economic agenda of austerity. This was 
very much the case of Italy, where the EU Commission demanded change of executive and proposed a list of measures 
that the government should implement. Lastly, the fact that in modern democracies, the self-regulating market pretends to 
govern society through technical criteria, questions the concept of legitimacy of political institutions. This is an example of 
how the economic crisis can be used as a tool of power to implement measures that in normal times would probably be 
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